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I. Introduction
In 2001, the Republic of Argentina defaulted on its bond
obligations by failing to make payments to its bondholders.' The
default prompted more than a decade of conflict between
f B.A., University of North Carolina, Wilmington, 2011; J.D. Candidate, University of
North Carolina School of Law, 2014. 1 would like to extend gratitude to my family for
their constant love and encouragement.
I See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 699 F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir.
2012).
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Argentina and a small group of creditors, which has yet to be
resolved.2 The creditors, largely consisting of hedge funds that
refused to accept restructured bonds,3 have pursued Argentina in
arbitration,' in U.S. courts,' and to the far-off shores of Ghana.
Argentine officials have emphasized that it will continue to pay
what it views as legitimate obligations, but "will not pay one
dollar toward the vulture funds."7 Paul Singer, founder of Elliot
Associates L.P. (Elliot), the hedge fund leading the holdouts, also
took an acrimonious tone in a letter to investors, writing: "[T]he
inexhaustible disregard for the rule of law by the political class has
2 See Drew Benson, Bond Vigilantes' Ghana Ambush Proves Default Hex
Unbroken, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 4, 2012, 5:07 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2012-10-04/bond-vigilantes-ghana-trap-shows-default-hex-argentina-credit.html.
3 See Robin Wigglesworth & Jude Webber, Ruling Raises Fear of Argentina
Default, FINANCIAL TIMES (Nov. 22, 2012, 5:42PM), http://www.ft.com/intli/
cms/s/0/6298aad8-3478- 11 e2-8986-00144feabdcO.html#axzz2LCOdItOO (noting that the
named plaintiff in much of the litigation, NML Capital Ltd., is a subsidiary of the
aggressive hedge fund, Elliot Management, which has made a business out of suing
countries on defaulted debt obligations).
4 See generally Abaclat v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/5,
Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (Aug. 4, 2011) (decision pending) (holding
that the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes has jurisdiction to
rule on sovereign debt disputes regarding Argentina's restructuring negotiations despite
the forum selection clause contained in the bonds issued by Argentina).
5 Jonathan Stempel & Hilary Burke, U.S. Court Ends Claims on Argentina Funds
at N Y. Fed, SECURITIES LAWS, THOMSON REUTERS (Mar. 28, 2012),
http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Securities/News/2012/03 - March/US_
court ends claims onArgentina funds at N Y Fed/ (explaining that various hedge
funds have pursued Argentina in connection with its 2001 default for over a decade,
including twelve separate cases in Southern District of New York).
6 See Benson, supra note 2 (documenting Elliot Management's action in Ghana,
resulting in an injunction against the ARA Libertad, an Argentine naval frigate, and
requiring that it stay in Ghana to satisfy Argentina's obligations to its creditors).
7 Argentina to Blast 'Vulture Funds' at the G20 Ministerial Meeting in Mexico,
MERCOPRESS: SOUTH ATLANTIC NEWS AGENCY (Nov. 4, 2012),
http://en.mercopress.com/2012/11/04/argentina-to-blast-vulture-funds-at-the-g20-
ministerial-meeting-in-mexico (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Argentine
Economy Minister Hernin Lorenzino). The term "vulture funds" refers to hedge funds
that buy distressed sovereign debt at nominal prices with a view towards seeking judicial
remedies that will allow the fund to collect the face value of the bond, resulting in a
massive profit for the hedge fund. Minister Lorenzino has also referred to the rulings of
the U.S. courts as "legal colonialism," and Argentina has suggested it will not honor
such decisions. See Argentina Vows to Keep Fighting U.S. Court Ruling on Debt,
REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2013, 3:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/l1/22/usa-
bonds-argentina-reaction-idUSE6E8EMO I E20121122.
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cost [Argentina] ... and it will continue to stand in the way of an
Argentine economic recovery."' At its most remarkable, the
dispute resulted in Elliot winning a judgment in Ghana.9 In
satisfaction of the judgment, Elliot levied on the ARA Libertad, an
Argentine triple-mast frigate, preventing the ship and crew from
leaving a Ghanaian port.'o Although not as headline grabbing, a
more significant victory for the holdouts came when the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York
granted an Injunction prohibiting Argentina from paying holders
of its restructured bonds unless it also, and at the same time, paid
the accelerated principal and interest owed to the holdout
bondholders." The United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit upheld the Injunction while rejecting an argument put forth
by Argentina, and the United States as amici curiae, that the
Injunction violated the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act's
(FSIA) prohibition on attachment and execution on sovereign
property located outside the United States. 2 The decision has
implications for the future of sovereign debt restructuring, which
is an essential tool for sovereigns who have defaulted and seek to
reenter the credit market.13
This Note will be divided into three sections: First, there will
be a summary of Argentina's default, the negotiation for issuance
8 Linette Lopez, Hedge Funder Paul Singer Went Ballistic on Argentina in his Q4
Investor Letter, BUSINESS INSIDER (Jan. 30, 2013, 1:13 PM), http://www.business
insider.com/elliott-management-q4-investor-letter-2013-1.
9 See Benson, supra note 2.
10 See id However, an international maritime tribunal subsequently overruled the
Ghanaian court, allowing the FAA Libertad to return to Argentina. See Liz Ford,
Maritime Tribunal Orders Ghana to Set Argentina's Libertad Frigate Free, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 17, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2012/dec/
17/maritime-tribunal-ghana-argentina-libertad.
11 See generally Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2012 WL
5895784 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012) (Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09
Civ. 1708 (TPG)) [hereinafter Order Clarifying Scope of Injunction] (holding that
Argentina has breached its obligations to the holders of the original bonds under an
Equal Treatment Clause, which prevents the debtor from subordinating or otherwise
treating unequally similarly positioned creditors, by continuing to pay the exchange
bondholders without also paying the holdouts).
12 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 262.
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of Exchange Bonds to the vast majority of the default
bondholders, and a brief history of the decade long dispute
between Argentina and the small group of holdouts; second, a
general discussion of the FSIA, the arguments presented to the
Second Circuit in favor of vacating the Injunction against
Argentina as a violation of the FSIA, and an analysis of the
Second Circuit's rejection of Argentina's arguments; finally, a
discussion of issues raised by the Second Circuit's interpretation,
implications of the case for the future of sovereign debt litigation,
and a proposal for facilitating restructuring where litigation has
reached an impasse.
II. Argentina's Default, Debt Swap, and Holdout Litigation
a. Renegotiation ofArgentina's Obligations and Subsequent
Conflict with Holdouts
Argentina first began issuing the debt securities at the center of
the suit between NML Capital (NML), a subsidiary of Elliot, and
Argentina in 1994.14 Argentina defaulted on its obligations to
bondholders in 2001." The default, and the subsequent economic
emergency that engulfed the Republic, prompted the Argentine
President to declare a "temporary moratorium" on all payments
due under the bonds.16 The moratorium has been renewed every
year since." No payments have been made to holders of the
original bonds.'8 In 2005 and 2010, Argentina entered
negotiations with the original bondholders in an attempt to
restructure its obligations by issuing new bonds, with the ultimate
goal of righting its fiscal ship and freeing itself from the burden of
the default."
The 2005 offer gave all bondholders the opportunity to
exchange their defaulted bonds for new debt securities (exchange
bonds).2 0 The restructured debt was worth approximately twenty-
14 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 251.
'5 See id.
16 See id (internal quotations omitted).
1 See id.
18 See id.
19 See id at 252; see also Salmon, supra note 13.
20 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 252.
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five to twenty-nine cents on every dollar owed under the original
bonds.2 1 In exchange, the bondholders agreed to vacate their
rights under the original bonds and adopt the terms of the
exchange bonds. 2 2  Seventy-six percent of the outstanding
securities were tendered for the new bonds in the initial
exchange.2 3 In 2010, bondholders again were offered an
exchange, on similar terms as the previous exchange, raising
participation to ninety-one percent of the foreign debt.24 To induce
maximum participation in the exchange, Argentina threatened that
the bonds "not tendered may remain in default indefinitely."25
Argentina made good on its promise to avoid payment on the
defaulted bonds by passing the Lock Law in 2005.26 The Lock
Law made it illegal for the Argentine government to enter
settlement negotiations or make any payments to anyone who
chose not to participate in the exchanges.2 7 The bondholders were
faced with the choice between taking the exchange bonds,
ensuring partial return on principal, or retaining the original bonds,
which Argentina made clear it had no intention of honoring.2 8
Initially, the exchange paid off for the bondholders who accepted;
"Argentina has made all payments due on the debt it restructured
in 2005 and 2010," while refusing to pay anything to the holdout
creditors.29
Bondholders, who opted out of the restructuring, at least those
willing to stomach protracted litigation, did retain a consolation
prize of sorts. The holdouts were free to pursue full performance
of the Republic's obligations under the original bonds. 30  The




24 See id at 253.
25 See id at 252 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting the 2005 prospectus).
26 See NAL Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 252; see also Law No. 26017, Feb. 9, 2005,
30590 B.O. 1, art. 2-4 (Arg.) [hereinafier Lock Law].
27 See NAL Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 252 (noting that Argentina temporarily
revoked the Lock Law in order to allow the 2010 restructuring offer); see also Lock
Law, supra note 26, art. 2-4.
28 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 252-53.
29 See id. at 253.
30 See id. at 252-54.
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in distress-asset investing, purchased the bonds on secondary
markets contemporaneous with or subsequent to the default.' As
a result of Argentina's impending financial distress, investors were
able to purchase the bonds at well below face value.3 2 Investors,
such as Elliot, who engage in the practice of buying sovereign debt
on the cheap once the issuer is in or approaching default, and then
suing to enforce the obligations at full value, are known as
"distressed asset investors," but are often referred to despairingly
as "vulture funds."33 Since NML's purchase of the defaulted
bonds, it pursued various avenues to gain complete performance of
Argentina's obligations under those securities. 34 Although Elliot
and NML have won various judgments against Argentina on
breach of contract and other equitable claims, the Republic refuses
to honor those judgments and "the FSIA has largely prevented [the
holdouts] from attaching the Republic's foreign assets to satisfy
those judgments."35
b. The District Court's Injunction
While the FSIA renders traditional means of satisfying a
judgment for monetary damages against a sovereign useless, NML
seized on the court's frustration with Argentina in winning an
unusually broad, but nonetheless creative, equitable remedy. The
Southern District of New York ordered Argentina to specifically
perform its obligations under the original bonds.36 The obligations
31 See id. (noting that some distressed asset investors, also known as vulture funds,
purchased the bonds as recently as 2010).
32 See id at 251.
33 See id.
34 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 252.
35 Id. at 253-54 n.5; see, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Repiblica
Argentina, 652 F.3d 172, 197 (2d Cir. 2011) (vacating plaintiffs' attachment of
Argentine Central Bank reserves); Aurelius Capital Partner, LP v. Republic of Argentina,
584 F.3d 120, 131 (2d Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to intercept assets that
would be acquired by the Argentine social security system); EM Ltd. v. Republic of
Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 472 (2d Cir. 2007) (affirming that plaintiffs may not attach
Argentine Central Bank reserves to satisfy obligations owed to it). But see NML Capital,
Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 680 F.3d 254, 260 (2d Cir. 2012) (affirming attachment of
Argentine assets); EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 389 Fed.Appx. 38, 43 (2d Cir.
2010) (affirming attachment of Argentine assets held in trust in the United States).
36 See generally Order Clarifying Scope of Injunction, supra note 11, at 2-6
(fashioning an equitable remedy that would prevent Argentina from paying the
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owed to holdouts under the original bonds are worth
approximately $1.33 billion. Judge Griesa granted NML partial
summary judgment in December 2011 on its claims under the
bonds' "Equal Treatment Provision."3  In February 2012, the
district court granted NML equitable relief in the form of an
Injunction providing "whenever the Republic pays any amount
due under the terms of the [exchange] bonds," it must pay the
holdouts the amount they are owed under the original bonds.39
NML's argument focused on the Equal Treatment Provision in
the original bond contracts. 40 The provision constituted a promise
from Argentina to the bondholders:
The Securities will constitute . . . direct, unconditional,
unsecured and subordinated obligations of the Republic and
shall at all times rank pari passu and without any preference
among themselves. The payment obligations of the Republic
under the Securities shall at all times rank at least equally with
all its other present and future unsecured and unsubordinated
External Indebtedness. 41
Argentina violated the Equal Treatment Provision by lowering
the rank of holdout creditors' rights in two ways: (1) "when [the
Republic] made payments currently due under the Exchange
Bonds, while persisting in its refusal to satisfy its payment
obligations currently due under NML's Bonds" and (2) when the
Republic enacted the Lock Law.42
A major hurdle to meaningful redress still existed. As seen in
previous cases, where the holdouts managed to win a judgment
only to be stymied in collection attempts, the real challenge in
sovereign default litigation is fashioning a meaningful
enforcement mechanism to compel payment without violating the
principles of sovereign immunity.43 Foreseeing that Argentina had
restructured bondholders without also paying the holdout litigants).
37 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 251.
38 See id. at 254.
39 Order Clarifying Scope of Injunction, supra note 11, at 3-4.
40 See Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2011 WL 9522565
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 7, 2011) (Nos. 08 Civ. 06978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708
(TPG)).
41 See id at 1-2 (emphasis in original).
42 See id.
43 See, e.g., NML Capital, Ltd. v. Banco Central de la Rep6blica Argentina, 652
2014 637
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no intention of voluntarily complying with its order, the district
court mandated that copies of the Injunction be distributed to "all
parties involved, directly or indirectly, in advising upon,
preparing, processing, or facilitating any payment on the Exchange
Bonds."" The order explicitly extended the scope of the
Injunction to all agents of Argentina, which could be liable for
"aiding and abetting" the Republic in violating the Injunction by
processing payments to exchange bondholders while continuing to
avoid obligations under the original bonds held by the holdouts.4 5
While the court could not enforce the Injunction against
Argentina's assets or any of its officials due to the Republic's
sovereign immunity, the court could enforce the provisions of the
Injunction against banks, and other firms involved in the payment
process, that would transfer funds from Argentina's reserves to
exchange bondholders. 46  The remedy is geared towards
circumventing the restrictions the FSIA places on collection
efforts against sovereign assets. 47  The hope being that firms
involved in the payment process will refuse to process any
payments due under the restructured bonds for fear of violating the
Injunction.
The Injunction left Argentina with few viable options. It could
violate the Injunction by continuing to pay only the restructured
debt, and risk subjecting the third parties involved in the payment
process to contempt sanctions. 48 Alternatively, if Argentina has a
change of heart and decides to cooperate with the court, it has two
choices. Argentina can avoid making any payments to the
holdouts and simultaneously default on the exchange bonds,
F.3d 172, 197 (2d Cir. 2011) (vacating plaintiffs' attachment of Argentine Central Bank
reserves); Aurelius Capital Partner, LP v. Republic of Argentina, 584 F.3d 120, 131 (2d
Cir. 2009) (rejecting plaintiffs' attempt to intercept assets that would be acquired by the
Argentine social security system).
44 Order at 4, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23,
2012) (Nos. 08 Civ. 6978 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1707 (TPG), 09 Civ. 1708 (TPG)) [hereinafter
Injunction], available at http:/Iblogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/files/2012/04/2012-02-23-
Equal-Treatment-Remedy-Order.pdf.
45 See id. at 5.
46 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 255.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2012).
48 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 262-63.
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inflaming its financial hardship. 49 Argentina could also comply
with the Injunction, and avoid another default, by paying
obligations due under the restructured debt and pay the holdout
bondholders."o There is little doubt the latter option is the one
Judge Griesa had in mind.
In justifying the dramatic remedy, Judge Griesa relied on the
irreparable harm that would otherwise befall the holdout creditors
in absence of an equitable remedy." Without Judge Griesa's use
of the court's equitable powers, it was feared that "NML would
never be restored to the position it was promised that it would hold
relative to other creditors in the event of default."5 2 The district
court pointed to two pivotal factors in finding that the equities
balanced in NML's favor: (1) the Republic's "unprecedented,
systematic scheme of making payments on other external
indebtedness, after repudiating its payment obligations to NML, in
direct violation of its contractual commitment set forth in" the
Equal Treatment Provision; and (2) "[i]n the absence of the
equitable relief . .. the Republic will continue to violate [Equal
Treatment Provision] with impunity."53 The district court gave
little credence to arguments that the broad scope of the Injunction
infringed upon Argentina's sovereign immunity and instead
focused on Argentina's role as a commercial entity, reasoning that
just as "any other entity entering into a commercial transaction,
there is a strong public interest in holding the Republic to its
contractual obligations."54 Argentina appealed Judge Griesa's
order and the Injunction to the Second Circuit."
49 See id.
50 See id.
51 See Injunction, supra note 44, at 2.
52 See id. While that line of thinking undoubtedly finds a solid foundation in
contract law, it could be argued that the court's reasoning carries much less power within
the context of this case given that many of the bonds were purchased after the default
had already occurred. See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 251 (noting that a large
portion of the bonds held by the holdouts were acquired after the default had occurred).
53 See Injunction, supra note 44, at 2.
54 See id at 3.
55 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 246.
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c. The Second Circuit's Opinion and the Trial Court's
Decision on Remand
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
upheld the district court's Injunction against Argentina and its
agents, but remanded the case for further clarification of the scope
of the Injunction as it applies to third parties involved in the
payment process who may be held liable for aiding and abetting
Argentina's violation of the Injunction." The opinion, and the
arguments of all interested parties, focused primarily on the
district court's interpretation of the Equal Treatment Provision in
the original bond contract." The Second Circuit interpreted the
provision to "bar[] Argentina from discriminating against
[NML's] bonds in favor of bonds issued in connection with the
restructurings."" Argentina argued that the pari passu clause was
mere boiler plate language that only provided protection from
legal or formal subordination, which it defined as giving formal
priority to claims of the exchange bondholders over the claims of
the holdouts.59 The court disagreed. It held that when reading the
two sentences of the Equal Protection Provision together it was
clear the protections guaranteed extended beyond what Argentina
had dubbed "formal subordination." 60  The first sentence,
containing the pari passu clause, "prohibits Argentina .. . from
formally subordinating the bonds by issuing a superior debt."6'
The second sentence, however, contains a promise that Argentina
will not pay any other bond obligations without also making
payments on the original bonds.62  Taken together, the two
sentences constituted a promise from Argentina to bondholders not
only to refrain from formally subordinating the bonds, but also to
refrain from taking any other action, such as paying one class of
bonds over another, that would in fact subject the bondholders to a
56 See id. at 264-65.
57 See id. at 251-52.
58 Id. at 250.
59 Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Republic of Argentina at 32-34, NML Capital,
Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105-cv(L)) [hereinafter Arg. Brief].
60 See NAL Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 258-59.
61 Id. at 259.
62 Id.
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lesser status.6 3
The Second Circuit had no problem finding support for the
district court's proposition that Argentina continually and brazenly
violated the provision by ranking the Republic's "payment
obligations to [NML] below those of the exchange bondholder."6 4
Three actions by the Republic formed the basis for the breach.65
First, Argentina refused to make payments on the original bonds
for six years, while "simultaneously timely servicing the Exchange
63 Id. For further discussion of pari passu clauses, their history, and their
significance within the context of sovereign debt contracts, see Rodrigo Olivares-
Caminal, The Pari Passu Interpretation in the Elliot Case: A Brilliant Strategy but an
Awful (Mid-Long Term) Outcome?, 40 HOFSTRA L. REv. 39, 45-49 (2011-2012) (arguing
that the interpretation of the pari passu clause in Elliot was an error because the clauses
have long been understood to apply only to the specific class of debt securities and that
its usefulness is limited because there is no bankruptcy regime to legally rank obligations
of a defaulted debtor); see also Robert A. Cohen, "Sometimes a Cigar is Just a Cigar":
The Simple Story of Pari Passu, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 12 (2011-2012) ("The debaters
generally fall into two camps: (1) those who oppose the equal treatment of creditors and
as a result ignore or distort the terms of the contract, and (2) those who believe that the
starting place for interpreting contractual provisions is the language of the contract and
the covenants providing for equal treatment offer creditors important protections.");
Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, To Rank Pari Passu or Not to Rank Pari Passu: That is the
Question in Sovereign Bonds after the Latest Episode of the Argentine Saga, 15 L. &
Bus. REV. AM. 745, 747-48 (2009) ("Post-Argentina's potential litigation could be based
on an actual breach of the pari passu clause. If this is the case, if there was an actual
breach of the pari passu clause, a new wake of litigation can be triggered."); Lee C.
Buchheit & Jeremiah S. Pam, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments, 53
EMORY L.J. 869, 871 (2004) ("For several decades, lenders and borrowers in the
international capital markets have, by their behavior, demonstrated a collective
understanding of the import of the clause . . .. Inevitably, there was a risk that the
oracular nature of the clause would tempt someone to speculate about alternative
meanings. That risk has recently materialized, with potentially serious consequences for
both lenders and borrowers."); William W. Bratton, Pari Passu and a Distressed
Sovereign's Rational Choices, 53 EMORY L.J. 823, 826 (2004) ("This Article addresses
the gap [in discussion that the broad reading of pari passu could benefit sovereign
bondholders], situating the clause in the economic context of sovereign debt
relationships."); Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott & Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths,
Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 72 (forthcoming 2013),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1633439 ("Focusing
on . . . the pari passu clause, this article explores two possible aspects of these myths.
First, it demonstrates that the myths are inaccurate as to both the clause's origin and the
role of lawyers in contract drafting. Second, the myths often are unflattering,
inaccurately portraying lawyers as engaged in little more than rote copying.").
6 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d.at 259-60.
65 See id
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Bonds." 66  Second, in filings with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), Argentina admitted to classifying the original
bonds in a separate category from its other debt, including the
exchange bonds, and made clear that it had no intention of paying
obligations under the original bonds.67 Finally, Argentina's
legislature enacted the Lock Law, which made it illegal for public
officials to pay the holdout bondholders and also prohibited
Argentine courts from recognizing any judgments in favor of the
holdouts.68
Having found Argentina in breach of the original bond
contract, the Second Circuit directed its focus to the Injunction
granted by the district court.69 Again siding with Judge Griesa, the
court found that the broad equitable remedy was necessary to
ensure specific performance because a traditional judgment of
acceleration and monetary damages would be ineffective.70 In the
court's view, the unprecedented remedy was warranted "[i]n light
of Argentina's continual disregard for the rights of its . .. creditors
and the judgments of our courts to whose jurisdiction it has
submitted."" Argentina argued that public policy compels the
court to dispense with the Injunction because it will "plunge the
Republic into a new financial and economic crisis." 72 Argentina
had "sufficient funds, including over $40 billion in foreign
currency reserves, to pay" the obligations owed to holdouts and
made no relevant argument that paying the holdouts would impair
the Republic's capacity to service other obligations.73 Argentina
66 See id at 260.
67 See id. Argentina tried to justify its position by saying that it was "not in a
legal ... position to pay." Id. (quoting Argentina's 18-K filing) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
68 See id. ("By contrast, were Argentina to default on the Exchange Bonds, and
were those bondholders to obtain New York judgments against Argentina, there would
be no barrier to the Republic's courts recognizing those judgments."). The court also
notes that, given the prohibitions of the Lock Law, even under the Republic's more
narrow interpretation of the pari passu clause, requiring formal or legal subordination for
breach, Argentina has breached the original bond contract. See id.
69 See id. at 262.
70 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 262.
71 See id.
72 See Arg. Brief, supra note 59, at 61; see also NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at
263.
73 See NML Capital, Lid, 699 F.3d at 263.
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also argued, with the assistance of the United States as amici
curiae, that the precedent set by the district court's decision would
threaten the sovereign debt restructuring system.7 4 The United
States argued that the decision would have the effect of allowing
"a single creditor to thwart the implementation of an
internationally supported restructuring plan."" The Second
Circuit made clear that the ball remains in the sovereign's court,
noting the sovereign, rather than any creditor, will be the one to
decide whether to address its debt obligations in a way that
"violates a pari passu clause."76 Moreover, according to the court,
it is unlikely that other sovereigns will be faced with a situation
akin to Argentina.77 The belief that Argentina has created for itself
a particularly precarious situation, one unlikely to be duplicated,
rests great faith in the power of collective action clauses, "which
[the court believes] effectively eliminate the possibility of
'holdout' litigation."78  Collective action clauses bind all
bondholders to a restructuring deal if a certain proportion,
generally a super majority, of the outstanding bonds are voted in
74 See id
75 See Brief for the United States of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Reversal at 5, NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105-cv(L))
[hereinafter U.S. Amicus Brief|.
76 See NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 264.
77 See id
78 See id But see Anna Gelpem, Sovereign Restructuring After NML v. Argentina:
CACs Don't Make Pari Passu Go Away, CREDIT SLIPS (May 3, 2012, 10:38 AM),
http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/05/sovereign-restructuring-after-nml-v-
argentina-cacs-dont-make-pari-passu-go-away.html (observing that the argument that
collective action clauses will effectively end holdout litigation fails for two reasons: (1)
sovereign debt is not always issued in a form that lends itself to collective action clauses;
and (2) an aggregation feature, "which allows majority amendment across multiple bond
series," are not standard in all bonds). For further discussion on collective action clauses
and their impact on sovereign debt restructuring, see generally Ana Gelpern & Mitu
Gulati, Sovereign Snake Oil (Am. Univ., WCL Research Paper No. 2011-05, Dec. 30,
2010), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1732650
(examining the use of collective action clauses as an ill-fitting and ineffective solution to
the sovereign debt crisis engulfing Europe); see also Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu
Gulati, A People's History of Collective Action Clauses (UNC Legal Studies Research
Paper No. 2172302, Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2 172302 (noting that collective action clauses have been a
marginal part of sovereign bond contracts for centuries, falling in and out of fashion, so
it is difficult to explain why they have now "become integral to the proper management
of public debt crises").
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favor.7 9 The court notes that such clauses "have been included in
99% of the aggregate value of New York-law bonds since January
2005, including Argentina's 2005 and 2010 Exchange Bonds.""
The court did take issue with the scope of the Injunction as it
applies to third parties and intermediaries."' The court remanded
the case to the district court in order to "precisely determine the
third parties to which the Injunctions will apply."8 2 The Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure allow injunctions to be enforced against
the named parties as well as those "in active concert or
participation with" the named party.83 On remand, the Southern
District of New York was charged with determining precisely
which third parties could be deemed "in active concert or
participation with" Argentina if the Republic decided to subvert
the Injunction by continuing to pay the restructured debt while
disregarding the rights of the holdouts.84
The district court made clear that "if Argentina is able to make
the payments on the Exchange Bonds without making the
payments to [the holdouts], the District Court and the Court of
Appeals' rulings and the Injunctions will be entirely for naught.""
To avoid that untenable outcome, the district court ensured all
parties involved in the payment process under the exchange bonds
would be held accountable to the court should they elect to play
any role in violating the Injunction.86 To that end, Judge Griesa
79 Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 78, at 2-5 ("To fix the problem [of holdouts
threatening sovereign debt restructuring], some observers claimed, bonds should adopt
new terms, called Collective Action Clauses (CACs), that allowed for collectively
binding restructuring decisions.").
80 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 264.
81 See id at 264-65.
82 See id. at 264.
83 FED. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C).
84 See Order Clarifying Scope or Injunction, supra note 11, at 5. The Southern
District of New York issued an Amended Injunction. For purposes of this Note any
distinctions between the two injunctions are not relevant. The Injunctions are concurrent
in scope, both in terms of prohibitions and applicability to third parties. Compare
Injunction, supra note 44, at 5, with Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina,
5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 21, 2012). For the sake of simplicity, the Injunctions will be collective
referred to as "the Injunction."
85 Id
86 See id. There are several parties and payments that are exempt from the
Injunction, specifically "intermediary banks" as defined under Article 4A of the
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interpreted the Injunction in the broadest terms possible, including
in its terms the Bank of New York Mellon, Bank of New York
Depositary, Cede & Co., the indenture trustee, and the clearing
system that processes the payment." The list of third parties
covers the payments system from the time the funds leave the
Argentine Treasury to the time they arrive in the hands of the
exchange bondholders, and every step in-between."
d. Writ of Certiorari
On January 7, 2013, Argentina filed a writ of certiorari89 in
response to the Second Circuit's first decision, which upheld the
district court's order entitling NML to ratable payments and
dispensed with Argentina's argument that the order violates the
FSIA. The crux of Argentina's argument to the Supreme Court is
that the Second Circuit erred in holding that "the FSIA places no
limitation on a United States court's authority to order blanket
post-judgment execution discovery on the assets of a foreign state
used for any activity anywhere in the world." 90 The United States
Supreme Court rejected Argentina's writ.91 Argentina may yet
have its case heard before the Supreme Court. As of this writing
Argentina has. yet to appeal the Second Circuit's subsequent
opinion, which will be discussed below, regarding Judge Griesa's
decision determining the scope of the Injunction as it pertains to
third parties.92 Argentina will have a right file another writ of
certiorari once the Second Circuit rules on the petition for en banc
review.93
Universal Commercial Code and payments made by Argentina to international
organizations such as the International Monetary Fund. See id. at 11; NML Capital, Ltd.,
699 F.3d at 261.
87 See Order Clarifying Scope of Injunction, supra note I1, at 9-10.
88 See id at 8-12.
89 Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 1, NML Capital, Ltd. (2013) (No. 12-842),
available at http://sblog.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/0 I /Final-Petition.
pdf.
90 See id. at 14.
91 Greg Stohr, Argentina Rejected by U.S. Court in Bond Payment Appeal,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 7, 2013, 6:09 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-10-
07/argentina-rejected-by-u-s-court-in-bond-payment-appeal.html.
92 See infra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
93 Anna Gelpern, Argentina Gets No SCOTUS Review-Yet (Yawn), CREDIT SLIPS
(Oct. 7, 2013, 10:05 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/10/argentina-gets-
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e. Return to the Second Circuit
After the district court issued its opinion clarifying the scope
of the Injunction, Argentina appealed, once again, to the Second
Circuit.94 The Second Circuit affirmed the scope of the Injunction,
noting that it applies directly only to Argentina." The Injunction
only affects third parties to the extent any third party attempts to
assist Argentina in processing payments to exchange bondholders
in violation of the Injunction.96 Again, Argentina and its
supporters failed to persuade the court that the remedy ordered by
the district court violated the FSIA.97 The court dispensed with the
argument, holding, "the original [I]njunctions-and now the
amended [I]njunctions-do not violate the FSIA because '[t]hey
do not attach, arrest, or execute upon any property' as proscribed
in the statute." 98 There was some modicum of good news for
Argentina. The court did impose a stay on the Injunction pending
further appeals.99 Due to the stay, Argentina can continue to pay
the exchange bondholders while failing to make payments to NML
and the other holdout creditors, which, in absence of the stay,
would be a violation of the Injunction.'o
III. Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act of 1973 and Argentine
Debt Litigation
The Republic continues to claim the Injunction violates the
prohibitions of the FSIA.'o' The Second Circuit dispensed with
Argentina's arguments under the FSIA, on two occasions, without
much difficulty.'0 2 Moreover, the court gave little credence, let
no-scotus-review-yet-yawn.html.
94 See NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 2013 WL 4487563, at *2 (2d
Cir. Aug. 23, 2013) [hereinafter NML Capital Il].
95 See id. at 11
96 See id
97 See id.
98 See id. at 4 (quoting NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262-63).
99 See id. at 11.
100 See Mark Weidemaier, More on an Argentine Debt Swap (and Why It Doesn't
Matter Whether the 'No Workaround' Injunction is Stayed), CREDIT SLIPS (Aug. 27,
2013, 2:02 PM) [hereinafter Argentine Debt Swap], http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2013/08/more-thoughts-an-argentine-debt-swap.html.
101 See NAML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 257.
102 See id. at 262.
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alone any semblance of deference, to the United States' arguments
that the Injunction violated the FSIA and was contrary to foreign
policy.o3  Reading the prohibitions in the FSIA against
attachment, arrest, and execution of sovereign property outside the
United States, the court found "compliance with the Injunctions
would not deprive Argentina of control over any of its property;
they do not operate as attachments of foreign property prohibited
by the FSIA."'04 Additionally, the court rejected the policy
arguments of Argentina and the United States that the remedy
requested by NML and the other holdouts would harm the United
States' relations with other sovereigns and would ruin Argentina's
efforts at fiscal and economic rehabilitation, "plung[ing Argentina]
into a new financial and economic crisis."'05
The idea that a sovereign state can be subject to suit by an
individual is a relatively new one.'06  Chief Justice Marshall
solidified the absolute theory of immunity in Schooner Exchange
v. McFadden, holding that the "full and absolute territorial
jurisdiction" is an "attribute of every sovereign," which prevents
one sovereign from infringing the sovereignty of another by
subjecting the former to the jurisdiction of the latter's courts.'07
By the mid-twentieth century the absolute theory of immunity was
giving way to a new standard.' 8  The State Department
annunciated a new view of sovereign immunity-restrictive
103 See id
104 See id
105 See id at 263 (internal quotations omitted).
106 See, e.g., George K. Foster, Collection from Sovereigns: The Current Legal
Framework for Enforcing Arbitral Awards and Court Judgments Against States and
Their Instrumentalities, and Some Proposals for its Reform, 25 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
665, 717 (2008) (noting that until the mid-twentieth century sovereign immunity was
considered absolute).
107 Schooner Exchange v. McFadden, 11 U.S. 116, 137 (1812); see also Foster,
supra note 106, at 117 (explaining that the case involved an effort by U.S. citizens to
seize a warship in possession of France in satisfaction of debts).
10 See W. Mark. C. Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt 8-9
(UNC Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2180228, Nov. 24, 2012) [hereinafter
Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt], available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract id=2180228 ("Until around the middle of the twentieth century, the
doctrine of absolute sovereign immunity posed a nearly insurmountable barrier to suit in
English and US Courts.").
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immunity-in the Tate Letter, issued in 1952.109 The Tate Letter
maintained absolute immunity where the State acts in its capacity
as a sovereign, jure imperii, but restricted immunity where the
State acts as a commercial entity, juri gestionis."o With respect to
jurisdiction, courts in the United States followed the Tate Letter's
interpretation, in that private parties could bring suits against
foreign states, but sovereigns retained "absolute immunity from
attachment and execution, absent [the State's] consent."'
In 1976, Congress passed the FSIA, codifying the restrictive
theory of sovereign immunity." 2 The Act was the culmination of
longstanding debate concerning the competing interests in
"avoiding judicial interference in foreign relations" and providing
private citizens who have been harmed by foreign sovereigns an
avenue for redress."' After the passage of the FSIA, many
countries followed suit by "abandon[ing] the absolute theory" and
moving to "recognize some sort of commercial property and
waiver exceptions."ll4 For purposes of analyzing the NML Capital
decisions, the FSIA has three relevant provisions: (1) extending
jurisdiction to claims by private citizens against a foreign
sovereign where the sovereign has waived immunity or engaged in
commercial activity; (2) allowing execution of judgments,
attachment, and arrest against sovereign property under certain
narrowly prescribed circumstances; and (3) allowing broader
execution rights where the sovereign has waived immunity from
execution, attachment, and arrest."'
109 See Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep't of State, to
Philip B. Perlamn, Acting Att'y Gen. (May 19, 1952), reprinted in 26 DEP'T ST BULL.
984-85 (1952) [hereinafter Tate Letter]; see also Foster, supra note 106, at 717
("[P]rivate parties were often without an effective avenue for pursuing claims when
disputes arose [with a sovereign] . . . . [M]any courts and commentators came to the
conclusion that it was no longer tenable to confer absolute immunity on States, and
began to advocate a 'restrictive' theory of immunity.").
I10 See Tate Letter, supra note 109; see also Foster, supra note 106, at 717-18.
1ll See Foster, supra note 106, at 718 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983)).
112 See Foster, supra note 106, at 718; see also Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign
Debt, supra note 108, at 13.
113 Note, Too Sovereign to be Sued: Immunity of Central Banks in Times of
Financial Crisis, 124 HARV. L. REv. 550, 550 (2010-11).
114 See Foster, supra note 106, at 718.
115 See Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra note 108, at 30-31.
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The FSIA contains "[the] sole and exclusive standards to be
used in resolving questions of sovereign immunity raised by
foreign states before Federal and State courts in the United
States."" 6 Foreign states have "presumptive immunity" from suit
under the FSIA, which may be rebutted where any of several
enumerated exceptions are met."' The first relevant exception to
the presumption of immunity is a foreign state "shall not be
immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of
the States in any case . .. in which the foreign state has waived its
immunity.""' Today, when countries issue debt securities abroad,
"they almost always include waivers of immunity from suit."'19
This was the case in NML Capital where "Argentina voluntarily
waived its immunity from the jurisdiction of the district court." 2 0
The FSIA also provides an exception to jurisdictional immunity
where the foreign state engages in "commercial activity" in the
United States or with a connection in the United States.12' The
reasoning behind the commercial actor exception is as follows:
"by descending to the level of a commercial actor, a foreign
government divests itself of its sovereign status. In other words,
when a foreign sovereign engages in commercial activity, that
foreign sovereign is no longer acting in a sovereign capacity. The
foreign sovereign sheds its sovereignty. ... The Supreme
Court has held the issuance of foreign government bonds in the
United States is a commercial activity sufficient to bring a claim
under the bond contracts in U.S. courts.123 Therefore, NML could
116 See H.R. REP No. 94-1487, pt. 11, at 12 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6604,1976 WL 14078.
117 See Report of the Working Group of the ABA, Reforming the Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 489, 506 (2002) [hereinafter
ABA Report]; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a). A "foreign state" is defined as an entity that
"includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality of a
foreign state." 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a).
118 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(1). The waiver can either be explicit or implicit, and
cannot be withdrawn once granted. See id.
119 Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra note 108, at 3.
120 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263.
121 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
122 Clinton L. Narver, Putting the "Sovereign" Back in the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act: The Case for a Time of Filing Test for Agency or Instrumentality Status,
19 B.U. INT'L L. J. 163, 197 (2001); see also Foster, supra note 106, at 719.
123 See Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 615 (1992).
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have based jurisdiction under the commercial activity exception,
even if Argentina had not waived its immunity.124
The provisions allowing creditors to bring suit against
sovereign debtors would be inconsequential, so long as U.S.
court's remained powerless to impose meaningful remedies
against the sovereign.12 5  The FSIA provides a presumption of
immunity from "attachment[,] arrest[,] and execution."'2 6 The
presumption, however, is subject to numerous exceptions.'27
Section 1610(a)(2) provides an exception where property located
within the United States "is or was used for the commercial
activity upon which the claim is based." 28 Commercial activity is
defined as "either a regular course of commercial conduct or a
particular commercial transaction or act." 29  The commercial
activity exception requires a "nexus between any commercial
property against which a judgment may be executed, and the
underlying claim upon which the judgment to be executed is
based."' 30 In Weltover, the U.S. Supreme Court held, "[W]hen a
foreign government acts, not as a regulator of a market, but in a
manner of a private player within it, the foreign sovereign's
actions are 'commercial' within the meaning of the FSIA."l 3 ' The
ultimate issue is "whether the particular actions that the foreign
state performs (whatever the motive behind them) are the type of
actions by which a private party engages in 'trade and traffic or
commerce.""' 3 2 To the satisfaction of plaintiffs, the definition of
commercial activity has been broadly defined, but there are still
124 See id at 615; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2).
125 See Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra note 108, at 15 ("[T]he
FSIA provided judgment-holders with limited rights to enforce a judgment against
sovereign assets.").
126 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
127 See id. at §§ 1610-11. "The execution immunity provisions of the Act, and
particularly section 1610, are generally regarded as among the most confusing and
ineffectual in the statute." ABA Report, supra note i 7, at 581.
128 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
129 Id. at 1603(d).
130 Jeremy Ostrander, Note, The Last Bastion of Sovereign Immunity: A
Comparative Look at Immunity from Execution of Judgments, 22 BERKELEY J. INT'L L.
541, 557 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
131 Weltover, 504 U.S. at 614.
132 Id. (internal emphasis omitted).
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substantial barriers to recovery. Notably the assets subject to
execution, arrest, or attachment must be located within the United
States and must be "used for the commercial activity upon which
the claim is based."'3 3 The first requirement is a problem where
the sovereign can simply move all assets out of the country where
litigation is anticipated.'3 4 The latter is also a hurdle in sovereign
debt litigation "[b]ecause the relevant commercial activity is
borrowing money, and because sovereigns quickly spend the
money they borrow, few assets will meet [the] definition."' It
will be difficult for any plaintiff to collect in sovereign debt
litigation, unless the sovereign waives its immunity under section
1610(a)(1).13 6 Unlike waivers of jurisdictional immunity, which
have become universal since the enactment of the FSIA, waivers
of immunity from execution, attachment, and arrest are relatively
rare.137
Given the difficulties plaintiffs encounter under the FSIA
when trying to collect traditional monetary damages from
sovereign debtors, it is not surprising that NML requested a novel
equitable remedy."' What is remarkable is the district court's
willingness to adopt such an approach, and the Second Circuit's
eagerness to affirm on two occasions.1' The Second Circuit relied
on a plain reading of the FSIA in ultimately holding that
"compliance with the Injunctions would not deprive Argentina of
control over any of its property, they do not operate as attachments
of foreign property prohibited by the FSIA."l 40 NML argued that
the Injunctions do not constitute an arrest, attachment, or
execution, and therefore did not violate Section 1609.14' The
Second Circuit followed NML's logic, finding all three terms
133 See 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
134 See Argentine Debt Swap, supra note 100, at 18.
135 Id.
136 See id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1610(a)(2).
137 See Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra note 108, at
15-18.
138 See Corrected Joint Response Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellees NML Capital, Ltd.,
Olifant Fund, Ltd., and Varela, et. al. at 58-64, NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir.
2012) (No. 12-105(L)) [hereinafter NML Response Brief].
139 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 265; NML Capital II, supra note 94, at *1.
140 NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 262.
141 NML Response Brief, supra note 138, at 60.
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referred to "a court's seizure and control over specific property."142
The district court's order does not seize or control any property of
Argentina's outside the United States, therefore the Injunction
merely "direct[s] Argentina to comply with its contractual
obligations not to alter the rank of its payments obligations."'4 3
There is no seizure of Argentina's property because it is firmly
within Argentina's capacity to comply with the injunction
"without the court's ever exercising dominion over sovereign
property."l44 For instance, Argentina is free to pay the amounts
owed on the exchange bonds, so long as it also chooses to pay the
holdouts.145  Alternatively, the court reasoned, Argentina could
make no payments on the exchange bonds or original bonds, and
instead incur another default.146  Under either option, the
Injunction does not mandate "Argentina to use any particular
asset, or set of assets, to come into compliance." 47  Since the
"Injunctions do not transfer any dominion or control over
sovereign property to the court," the Injunctions do not violate the
prohibitions of Section 1609.148
Argentina disagreed with NML's arguments and the Second
142 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262 & n.13. "An attachment is the seizing of a
person's property to secure a judgment or to be sold in satisfaction of a judgment." Id.
(quoting BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 123 (9th ed. 2009)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). "An arrest is seizure or forcible restraint." Id. (quoting BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 124 (9th ed. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Execution is an act
of dominion over specific property by an authorized officer of the court ... which results
in the creation of a legal right to subject the debtor's interest in the property to the
satisfaction of the debt of his or her judgment creditor." Id (quoting 30 AM. JUR. 2D.
Executions § 177) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143 NML Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at 262; see also NML Response Brief, supra note
138, at 60 ("The hallmarks of any attachment or execution are the seizure by the court of
specific interests in property of the debtor. Thus, courts have deemed an order to be an
attachment only when it effects a seizure of specific property that deprives the owner of
meaningful possessory interest in that property.") (citing United States v. Va Lerie, 424
F.3d 694, 702 (8th Cir. 2005)).
144 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262-63.
145 See id at 262-63.
146 See id at 263.
147 NML Response Brief, supra note 138, at 62; see also NML Capital, Ltd, 699
F.3d at 263 ("The Injunctions do not require Argentina to pay any bondholder any
amount of money; nor do they limit other uses to which Argentina may put its fiscal
reserves.").
148 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 263.
652
INADEQUACY OF REMEDIES UNDER THE FSIA
Circuit's subsequent opinion, arguing the Injunction "interfere[s]
with the Republic's use of its property located outside the United
States, where it is indisputably immune from restraint by United
States courts under [Section 1609 of] the FSIA."14 9  Argentina
relied on Second Circuit precedent, which held "courts are also
barred from granting 'by injunction, relief which they may not
provide by attachment.""" Since the Injunction either prevented
Argentina from paying a large amount of otherwise immune funds
owed to the exchange bondholders, no matter where in the world
those funds were located, or compelled the payment of funds to
the holdouts in the event exchange bondholders were paid, it was
in essence an attachment of some funds in violation of the FSIA.'5 '
The choice between paying the holdouts and defaulting on the
exchange bonds was, according to Argentina, a coercive
mechanism that effected an "end-run around the FSIA," which
was expressly prohibited by the holding in S & S Machinery Co.'5 2
Ultimately, Argentina claimed it was irrelevant that the Injunction
"[did] not literally attach or execute on Republic property,"
because the Injunction does in fact "require a turnover of property
not in the United States, and therefore outside the scope of the
court's enforcement powers."' 5 3
The United States joined Argentina's arguments, adding a
foreign policy gloss to the Republic's positions under the FSIA.
Generally, the United States' support would have commanded
some persuasive authority considering the implications of the case
on foreign relations with the numerous nations that register bonds
under New York law. 5 4 The United States has a foreign policy
interest in assisting restructurings supported by the international
149 Arg. Brief, supra note 59, at 50.
150 NAIL Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262 (quoting S & S Mach. Co. v.
Masinexportimport, 706 F.2d 411, 418 (2d Cir. 1983)).
151 See Arg. Brief, supra note 59, at 52.
152 See id
153 See Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellant the Republic of Argentina at 5, NAL
Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (12-105-cv(L)) [hereinafter Arg. Reply Brief].
154 See U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 29; see also Brief for the United States
of America as Amicus Curiae in Support of the Republic of Argentina's Petition for
Panel Hearing and Rehearing En Banc at 6-8, NAIL Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir.
2012) (No. 12-105) [hereinafter U.S. Brief for Rehearing].
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community."' The United States argued Argentina's assets were
in fact attached and, therefore, the constraints of the Injunction, as
they applied to otherwise immune assets, violated Section 1609.156
The Second Circuit dispensed with these arguments, noting, in a
circular fashion, that the Injunction did not achieve the result of an
attachment, arrest, or execution because it does not in fact "attach,
arrest, or execute upon any property."'
Although the Second Circuit's reasoning was not exhaustive,
its conclusion was consistent with Section 1609. Under the plain
terms of the statute, the Injunction is permissible.'"' The
Injunction is not an "execution" because NML's rights were not
first reduced to monetary value in the form of a judgment.'5 9
While Elliot and NML had previously won monetary judgments in
other proceedings, no such judgment was entered by the District
Court in the present case.16 0 The Injunction is not an "attachment"
or an "arrest" given that no specific property of the Republic was
restrained.16' All funds belonging to Argentina could be disposed
in any way the Republic saw fit, with the exception of paying the
restructured debt without also paying the holdout creditors.' 62 The
crux of Argentina's argument was that the Injunction had the
effect of preventing funds designated for payment of the
restructured debt to be used for that purpose, which constituted a
de facto attachment, regardless of whether any specific funds
within the treasury could be identified as those restrained.163 The
argument advanced by Argentina ignores the key fact that
distinguishes the Injunction from an impermissible attachment or
arrest. Under the Injunction, the Republic is free to spend every
peso in its treasury so long as it does not make any payments on
the restructured debt, which would have the effect of
155 U.S. Amicus Brief, supra note 75, at 18-26.
156 U.S. Brief for Rehearing, supra note 154, at 7.
157 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262.
158 See id
159 See 30 AM. JUR. 2D. Executions § 177.
160 See Injunction, supra note 44, at 2-5; see also NAL Capital, Ltd, 699 F.3d at
255-58.
161 See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 123-24 (9th ed. 2009).
162 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262-63.
163 Arg. Brief, supra note 59, at 50.
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subordinating the original bonds.'64 Argentina could make
massive expenditures, depleting all of its funds located in the
treasury and elsewhere, on defense, domestic programs, and even
on service of other debt, providing payment of that debt would not
subordinate the holdout bonds. 165 Therefore, no specific asset or
set of assets are restrained in a manner that would constitute an
attachment or arrest.16 6 Argentina's argument may have resonated
with the Second Circuit had the Injunction required the Republic
to set aside specific funds and prohibited the specified funds
expenditure for any purpose other than payment of obligations
under the defaulted bonds, but that was not the case. 6 7
IV. Implications for the Future of Sovereign Debt
Restructuring and Litigation
A. No End in Sight: The Injunction will do Little to End the
Stalemate Between Argentina and Elliot
Despite Elliot's victories in its latest bout with Argentina, a
resolution to the dispute remains elusive. As noted above, the
court has left Argentina with three choices: (1) pay its obligations
under the exchange bonds, at which point the Injunction compels
the Republic to also pay the full amount owed to the holdouts; (2)
refuse to pay the holdouts and default on the obligations under the
exchange bonds, causing new financial hardship; or (3) pay its
obligations under the exchange bonds while continuing to
disregard the obligations under the original bonds, inviting the ire
of the court and potentially subjecting complicit third parties to
contempt sanctions.' Argentina has made clear that, in light of
political and economic circumstances, it will not pay the holdout
creditors.169  Speculation that Argentina will default on the
exchange bonds to avoid making payments to holdouts has already
begun.170 Another default would be a great blow to Argentina's
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fiscal reform efforts and will raise new problems associated with
additional restructuring.' 7 ' Ironically, a consequence of another
default would be the potential for further holdout problems.'7 2
If Argentina defaults on its obligations under the exchange
bonds, the effectiveness of the Injunction as an enforcement tool
will be compromised.'7 3 NML, in seeking the Injunction, hoped
the Republic would pay what is owed on the original bonds to
avoid the threat of another default.'74 Argentina has shown, at
least publicly, that it is undeterred by the prospect of another
default. 17
Argentina's refusal to make payments on the original bonds in
the face of the Injunction means the dispute could carry on
indefinitely. 7 6  Elliot will continue to hound Argentina in court
with no hope of gaining an effective remedy.'77 Sovereign
immunity will shield Argentina from any meaningful enforcement
of obligations under the defaulted bonds.'7 8 Holders of the
restructured bonds will not be paid because Argentina will not be
171 See id
172 See id.
173 See Mark Weidemaier, Pari passu Realpolitik, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 1, 2013,
11:25 AM) [hereinafter Realpolitik], http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/03/pari-
passu-realpolitik.html; see also Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Bankruptcy, Day One: Market
Rallies, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2013/03/sovereign-bankruptcy-day-one-market-rallies.html.
174 See Amended Injunction, supra note 11.
175 See Hilary Burke, Argentina Faces Very Different Debt Default if Loses Legal
Fight, REUTERS (May 13, 2013, 7:06 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/05/13/
us-argentina-debt-idUSBRE94COAB20130513.
176 As of this writing there are reports that Elliot is negotiating a settlement with the
holders of the exchange bonds. The proposed plan would involve the exchange
bondholders making payments to the holdouts out of their receipts from Argentina. In
exchange Elliot would drop all actions in pursuit of Argentina, allowing the Republic to
continue paying the exchange bondholders. See Joseph Cotterill, Look Ma, No Uniquely
Recalcitrant Sovereign, FT ALPHAVILLE (Nov. 1, 2013, 5:38 PM),
http://ftalphaville.ft.com/2013/11/01/1677502/look-ma-no-uniquely-recalcitrant-
sovereign/.
177 See Nate Raymond, Bondholders Lose Bid to Lift Stay in Argentina Litigation,
REUTERS (Nov. 1, 2013, 2:07 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/l 1/01/us-usa-
court-argentina-idUSBRE9AOOPN20131101 (noting that Elliot has continued to pursue
collection efforts against Argentina, even though the Injunction appears not have had the
desired effect).
178 See NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 262-63; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
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able to find any financial institution, securities firm, or payment
processor willing to aid and abet its violation of the Injunction. 179
Ultimately, Argentina will be prevented from bringing order to its
fiscal house.'s
The status quo of ceaseless conflict cannot be appealing to any
of the interested parties. As discussed below, the current stalemate
calls into question whether changes to the FSIA and the sovereign
immunity principles, at least as they apply to sovereign debt
litigation, are needed to facilitate sovereign restructuring where
the courts are faced with unyielding, well resourced creditors and
recalcitrant debtors.'
B. How Far will the Ripples Travel?
The district court's Injunction, and the opinions of the Second
Circuit upholding it, made waves across the sovereign debt world,
but in the immediate aftermath it remains to be seen whether the
case will ripple to other restructuring efforts. It is generally
accepted that the Injunction was a creative use of the courts
equitable powers, one which has no precedent in modem
sovereign debt litigation.18 The applicability of the Injunction to
future restructuring efforts is a more contested issue.'83 If the
Injunction were limited to the circumstances seen in NML Capital,
the case would not have much impact on the wider universe of
sovereign debt litigation.'8 4 The Second Circuit urged such a
reading in both of its opinions.'"' The court emphasized the
179 The Injunction should be more effective in deterring third parties from aiding
Argentina in thwarting the Injunction, especially considering they do not have the benefit
of sovereign immunity to shield them from contempt.
180 See Hilary Burke, supra note 175 (examining some of the fallout from
continued litigation and the possibility of another default).
181 See supra Section III.C.
182 See Felix Salmon, Elliot vs Argentina: It's Not Over Yet, REUTERS (Aug. 23,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/08/23/elliott-vs-argentina-its-not-over-
yet/; see also Mark Weidemaier, Argentina Loses . . Big, REUTERS (Aug. 23, 2013,
10:36 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/08/argentina-loses-big.html.
183 Compare NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 264; with Anna Gelpern, supra note
78, and Mark Weidemaier, Argentina's (Not So) Unusual Pari Passu Clause, CREDIT
SLIPS (Nov. 5, 2012, 7:00 AM), http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2012/11/argentinas
-not-so-unusual-pari-passu-clause.html.
184 See NML Capital, Ltd. 699 F.3d at 264-65.
185 See id.
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special circumstances of the Argentine default influenced the
interpretation of the Equal Payment Provision, which in turn
justified the unusual exercise of the court's equitable powers.18 6
Two factors lead the courts to believe that the ongoing dispute
between Argentina and Elliot presents a unique case.' First,
while many sovereign debt contracts contain pari passu clauses,
Argentina's contract contains the added provision that no creditor
shall be subject to subordination, which the court presumed is not
included in other sovereign debt contracts.188 The court hinted that
the second sentence of the Equal Protection Provision weighed
heavily in its interpretation.' 89 In absence of the second sentence,
the court suggested a different outcome was possible.' 90 Second,
the court repeatedly noted the great lengths Argentina went to stiff
the holdouts.' 9' Dubbing Argentina a "uniquely recalcitrant"
debtor, the court cited Argentina's continuing payment on the
exchange bonds, multiple statements claiming it would never pay
the holdouts, regardless of what U.S. courts ordered, and
codification of the Republic's public stance through the Lock
Law.' 92 The court's implicit suggestion being that a debtor who
was less brazen in its refusal to meet contractual obligations and
less vocal about its general disregard for the orders of U.S. courts
might not warrant the same treatment as Argentina.19 3
There is reason to be skeptical of the court's claims regarding
the unique nature of the Argentine default. 19 4 First, there is doubt
whether any significant distinction exists between the Argentine
Equal Treatment Provision and the pari passu clauses in countless





190 See NML Capital, Ltd. 699 F.3d at 264-65.
19I See id
192 See NMIL Capital I, supra note 94, at * 23 ("We further observed that cases like
this one are unlikely to occur in the future because Argentina has been a uniquely
recalcitrant debtor and because newer bonds almost universally include collective action
clauses.").
193 See id.
194 See Anna Gelpern, supra note 78; see also Mark Weidemaier, supra note 183.
195 See Mark Weidemaier, Robert Scott, and Mitu Gulati, Origin Myths, Contracts,
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bond contract, payments to some bond holders and not others will
constitute subordination in violation of the contract, regardless of
any other factors that may cause the court to view the debtor with
more or less empathy.19 6  While a court may be less likely to
exercise its equitable powers where disregard for bondholders'
rights is less egregious, there is no reason to believe, under the
Second Circuit's interpretation, that breach will not be found
where the debtor refuses to make ratable payments to all
bondholders.197
In the immediate aftermath of the Second Circuit's decisions,
market participants have provided some evidence that NML
Capital will have a substantial impact on the issuance,
restructuring, and litigation of sovereign debt.'98 The International
Monetary Fund' 99 and the Republic of France200 thought the
opinions sufficiently implicated their interest so as to warrant the
filing of amicus briefs urging the Supreme Court of the United
States to accept Argentina's writ of certiorari.20 ' The Republic of
Columbia,20 2 the United Mexican states,203 and the Republic of
and the Hunt for Pari Passu, 38 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 72 (2013); see also Mark
Weidemaier, supra note 183.
196 NMvL Capital Ltd., 699 F.3d at 261-63.
197 See id.
198 See infra notes 199-207.
199 Sandrine Rastello & Katia Porzecanski, IMF's Legarde Drops Proposal to Back
Argentina in Debt Case, THE WASHINGTON POST (July 24, 2013, 5:44 PM),
http://washpost.bloomberg.com/Story?docld=1376-MQF5BDIA74E901-
4TO2NBG2P3TS69LA3P5RV510EF.
200 See generally Brief for the Republic of France as Amicus Curiae in Support of
the Republic of Argentina's Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 1-6, Argentina v. NML
Capital, Ltd. (2013) (No. 12-1494), 2013 WL 3930517, at * 1-6 [hereinafter French
Amicus Brief] (arguing in support of Argentina's position that the Southern District of
New York's Injunction violated principles of sovereign immunity and the FSIA).
201 See Rastello & Porzecanski, supra note 199. The IMF announced its intention
to file an amicus curiae brief in support of Argentina's petition. The IMF later retracted
its statement, noting that it would not longer file its brief. Reports cited pressure from
the United States as a major factor informing the IMF's decision. The pressure from the
United States is somewhat strange when considering that the United States filed its own
briefs in the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in support of
Argentina. See id.
202 Republic of Columbia, Prospectus S-9 (Dec. 20, 2011).
203 United Mexican States, Prospectus, Supplemental Risk Factor Disclosure (Jan.
7,2013).
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Paraguay20 4 listed the ongoing litigation as a risk factor in
documents filed with the SEC in connection with their own
forthcoming debt offerings. 2 05  The actions of the countries and
organization noted above, coupled with the previously strong
support Argentina received from the United States, sustain a view
that the NML Capital decisions will not be limited to their facts,
but instead represent a new weapon for creditors. 20 6 However, the
most persuasive factor evidencing the impact of the case on future
litigation is the suit brought against Grenada in the wake of the
Second Circuit's rulings seeking to enforce rights under defaulted
bonds. 2 07  The plaintiff-creditor in that case asserts the same
arguments sanctioned by the Southern District of New York in
NML Capital.2 0 8 Irrespective of the Second Circuit's limiting
admonishments; it appears there will be no shortage of creditors
lining up to seize upon the previously dormant pari passu clauses
in their defaulted bonds.209
C. The Court Needs a Stronger Stick to Compel Resolutions
in Sovereign Debt Litigation
Argentina's obstinance in the face of financial hardship and
204 Republic of Paraguay, Offering Circular 17 (Jan. 17, 2013).
205 All three documents explained the risk factor associated with the Argentine
litigation as follows:
In ongoing litigation in the federal courts in New York captioned NML Capital
v. Republic of Argentina, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
ruled that the ranking clause in bonds issued by Argentina prevents Argentina
from making payments in respect of the bonds unless it makes pro rata
payments on defaulted debt that ranks pari passu with the performing
bonds. . . . [A] final decision that requires ratable payments could potentially
hinder or impede future sovereign debt restructurings and distressed debt
management.
Republic of Columbia, Prospectus S-9 (Dec. 20, 2011); United Mexican States,
Prospectus, Supplemental Risk Factor Disclosure (Jan. 7, 2013); Republic of Paraguay,
Offering Circular 17 (Jan. 17, 2013).
206 See French Amicus Brief, supra note 200, at 1-6; see also Republic of
Columbia, Prospectus S-9 (Dec. 20, 2011); United Mexican States, Prospectus,
Supplemental Risk Factor Disclosure (Jan. 7, 2013); Republic of Paraguay, Offering
Circular 17 (Jan. 17, 2013).
207 See Exp.-Imp. Bank of Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13-1450 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 2013).
208 See id
209 See, e.g., id.
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adverse court decisions brings the efficacy of the district court's
Injunction into a harsh light.210  The Injunction is a coercive
remedy, one with the express design of forcing the State's hand.21 '
Courts are generally hesitant to issue such remedies against
sovereign entities, realizing that while they are not expressly
forbidden under the FSIA,2 12 a use of the court's equitable powers
impacts traditional notions of sovereignty.2 13 If Argentina, without
flinching, is willing to flaunt the Injunction by taking the exact
course of action the court sought to discourage, the legitimacy of
U.S. courts as a forum for adjudicating disputes with sovereign
debtors has been harmed.2 14
The Second Circuit breathed new life into the pari passu
clause, invigorating other bondholders who may try their hand at
coercing payment by invoking the equitable powers of the court.2 15
However, if entrenched sovereigns are willing to suffer self-
inflicted pain, Argentina has provided a blueprint for eluding
creditors indefinitely. A status quo could emerge, whereby well
funded creditors are more eager than ever to sue to collect on
sovereign debt, but just as unlikely to succeed in that endeavor.2 16
Perpetual litigation with holdout creditors will frustrate sovereign
debt restructuring to the detriment of the stakeholders who do not
have the resources to orchestrate a global collection effort and are
not fortunate enough to be shrouded in sovereign immunity.2 17
210 See Felix Salmon, Elliot vs Argentina: Enter the Crazy, REUTERS (Aug. 27,
2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2013/08/27/elliott-vs-argentina-enter-the-
crazy/.
211 See generally Injunction, supra note 44, 2-5 (requiring Argentina to pay the
holdout creditors when it pays the holders of its restructured debt, which is the only way
to avoid another default).
212 See 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
213 See W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Anna Gelpem, Injunctions in Sovereign Debt
Litigation, YALE J. ON REG. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 2), available at
http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2330914 ("On the other hand, the
idea of one government commanding another seems to strike at the heart of sovereign
equality.").
214 See generally id. ("[Jiudges do not want to look feckless and seldom will issue
injunctions unless they believe the sovereign will feel significant pressure to comply.").
215 See Exp.-Imp. Bank of Republic of China v. Grenada, No. 13-1450 (S.D.N.Y.
Aug. 19, 2013).
216 See supra notes 194-206 and accompanying text.
217 See Benedict Mander, Funds Offer Way to Avert Default by Argentina,
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As noted by Professors Mark Weidemaier and Anna Gelpern,
the real bite of the Injunction harms third parties, which are least
at fault for the current quagmire. 2 18  Notably, the third parties
prohibited from aiding or abetting Argentina's violation of the
Injunction are the only entities subject to contempt sanctions.2 19
Taking into consideration Argentina's enduring refusal to make
any payments to the holdouts, the equitable remedy as fashioned
by the district court offers no realistic avenue to repayment when
facing an entrenched debtor.22 0  The regime established in the
wake of NML Capital is costly for all parties involved and lacking
in equity toward interested bystanders.
It would be more efficient to refuse to issue similar
injunctions in future cases, giving creditors a clear sign that
collection attempts will be stymied. A consistent refusal to
exercise equitable powers would provide incentive for debtors to
consent to restructuring when offered, no matter how deep the
discount.22 1 Sovereign debt restructuring would be a much simpler
process, but at what cost. Serial defaulters, such as Argentina,
would have even less incentive to honor obligations and work with
FINANCIAL TIMES (Oct. 24, 2013, 9:40 AM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2537ebf8-
3cO7-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de.html#axzz2kO2mjm4z ("The acrimonious legal battle
between a group of hedge funds and Argentina that could tip the country into default,
and make future sovereign debt restructurings harder.").
218 See Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 213, at 7. The Professors note the
deliberate choice of the court to turn its enforcement mechanisms toward the third
parties:
To ensure that default is the only alternative, the injunction also highlights the
risk of contempt sanctions for trustees, securities clearing houses, and payment
systems operators around the worlds. The impact of the injunction on these
parties is not an unfortunate byproduct of the remedy, nor merely a natural
consequence of ordinary procedural rules against aiders and abettors. It is a
deliberate design choice, made in light of the fact that the injunction cannot
reach its primary target, to induce third parties to pressure Argentina to comply.
See id
219 Order Clarifying Scope of Injunction, supra note 11, at 10-12; see also
Weidemaier & Gelpern, supra note 213, at 6-7.
220 See supra note 182-209 and accompanying text.
221 See Elizabeth Broomfield, Subduing the Vultures: Assessing Government Caps
on Recovery in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 2010 CoLUM. Bus. L. REV. 473, 518-22
(explaining that where contractual defenses and statutory caps on recovery are in place,
sovereign debt litigation has decreased in response).
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creditors in the event of default.222
Instead, courts must have a more powerful enforcement
mechanism at their disposal, one which will create greater
leverage to facilitate settlement. The mechanism must be capable
of encouraging even the most well funded distressed asset investor
and most recalcitrant debtor to negotiate regarding a settlement.
Any solution, however, cannot coerce the sovereign to make
payments of otherwise immune funds.2 23 The FSIA continues to
stand as a formidable obstacle to the enforcement of traditional
damages remedies.22 4 The court must work within the current
framework of sovereign immunity, as codified in the FSIA, to find
a functional solution to protracted sovereign debt litigation. If
stubborn sovereigns are permitted to run rampant over the rule of
law with little impediment, the creditors have no leverage with
which to bargain. 2 25  Although Elliot is by no means a saint,2 26 it
does offend one's sense of equity to see a sovereign with
Argentina's history-disrespecting court judgments in
jurisdictions to which it has voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction,
making statements harming any hope at negotiation, and passing
legislation to avert any possibility of payments to holdouts-find
solace within the fortress of the FSIA's immunity provisions.2 27
222 See generally Richard D. Thomas, Comment, Tipping the Scales in Chapter 11:
How Distressed Debt Investors Decrease Debtor Leverage and the Efficacy of Business
Reorganization, 27 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J. 213, 215 (describing how the involvement of
distressed asset investors in chapter 11 bankruptcies decreases the leverage of the debtor
in negotiations with creditors).
223 See 28 U.S.C. § 1609.
224 See 228 U.S.C. § 1603 et seq.
225 See generally Jill E. Fisch & Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards?: The
Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1043, 1044 (2004)
("[T]he absence of a formal proceeding for evaluating the debtor's financial condition
creates a risk of unreasonable restructuring terms.").
226 See generally id at 1045 ("[Holdout creditors] are also often subject to
extensive criticism. Holdout creditors have been charged with delaying the restructuring
process, thereby imposing unnecessary burdens on the citizens of the sovereign debtors.
They have also been denounced for seeking payments for themselves at the expense of
other creditors or at the risk of jeopardizing the restructuring."). NML is in the business
of buying defaulted bonds at nominal prices after the issuer has already defaulted with an
eye towards protracted litigation and general harassment of the issuer, which it hopes
will encourage the sovereign to pay it face value, at considerable profit, to resolve the
whole matter. See supra notes 6-8 and accompanying text.
227 Bob Van Voris & Christie Smythe, Argentina Says It Won't Voluntarily Comply
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The protections against execution and attachment under
Section 1609 result in a "right without a remedy."2 28 Fifty years
before the FSIA was passed into law, Andrew Mellon, then
Secretary of the Treasury, stated:
No nation, except by the pressure of public opinion and the
necessities of its own credit, can be compelled to pay a debt to
another nation. An insistence on a funding agreement in excess
of the capacity of the nation to pay would justify it in refusing to
make any settlement. None can do the impossible . ... It
follows that those who insist upon impossible terms are in the
final analysis working for an entire repudiation of the debts.229
Secretary Mellon's words have not lost their pertinence, despite
the almost century that has passed.2 30 A creditor who has been
aggrieved by a sovereign's default will only receive payment
where the sovereign voluntarily meets its obligations, which is
unlikely given the perverse incentives the FSIA provides against
cooperation.23
Several amendments to the FSIA have been proposed, but
none effectively addresses the issues posed by sovereign debt
litigation. One reform that has been suggested is to reverse the
current presumption under the FSIA so that "[r]ather than having
an exception that denies immunity to property if [the assets are] in
use for a commercial activity[,]" have "a general rule that makes
property of sovereigns available to its creditors, subject to an
exception that confers immunity on property in use for a sovereign
With Bond Ruling, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 28, 2013, 12:01 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/2013-02-27/argentina-seeks-relief-from-u-s-court-in-debt-fight.html.
228 Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 784 F.2d 790, 798 (2d Cir. 1984).
229 Andrew Mellon, Statement by Secretary Mellon before the Ways and Means
Committee concerning the Settlement of Indebtedness of Belgium, Czechoslovakia,
Estonia, Italy, Latvia and Rumania (January 4, 1926), SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
REPORT ON THE FINANCES OF 1926, Exhibit 12, at 212, reprinted in SELECTED ARTICLES
ON INTERALLIED DEBTS AND REVISIONS OF THE DEBT SETTLEMENTS 67, 77-78 (James
Thayer Gerould & Laura Shearer Turnbull, eds., 1928).
230 See generally Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra 108, at 32 ("It is
true that, before the statute, sovereign assets were absolutely immune from execution. As
a practical matter, however, the statute did little to change this for post-FSIA bonds.").
231 See id. at 29 ("Given this dynamic it would make no sense to pay successful
litigants voluntarily; doing so would encourage holdouts and potentially derail the
restructuring.").
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activity." 23 2 The reverse presumption would certainly help some
classes of creditors, specifically judgment creditors who won tort
claims. 23 3 The amendment would do little for holdout creditors in
sovereign debt litigation.234  Generally, the proceeds of the bond
issue are spent quickly, so the holdout creditor is left to pursue
other assets, which the sovereign will ensure are used for
sovereign activity.235
Another alternative would be an international agreement, one
which establishes a fund to "pay amounts due to creditors under
awards or judgments against participating States."2 36 Again, this
alternative wodld be a viable option for tort and other judgment
creditors, but would be ineffectual with regard to sovereign debt
litigation. It is unlikely that states with sterling credit records
would be willing to subsidize the defaults of other nations.
Moreover, states with a history of default and the potential for
future defaults-such as Argentina-would not adhere to an
agreement that provided for payments to vulture funds.237 If such
a system were to exist, many states would seek to exclude vulture
funds from receiving payment out of the common fund, and
therefore, the system would not resolve litigation of the type seen
in NML Capital.238
No amendment to the FSIA will remedy the problem
illuminated by NML Capital without gutting the heart of the
statute and displacing traditional principles of sovereign
immunity.23 9 Judge Griesa was on the right tract in using the
court's equitable powers to craft the Injunction. Problems ensued
because the coercive aspects of the Injunction-contempt
sanctions in the event of violation-could only be exercised
232 Foster, supra note 106, at 720.
233 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1612.
234 See generally Weidemaier, Sovereign Immunity and Sovereign Debt, supra note
108, at 28 ("The statute does not guarantee creditors meaningful relief The sovereign
may not keep assets in the enforcing jurisdiction or may remove assets in anticipation of
being sued. Judgment creditors thus tend to recover only if sovereigns willingly pay the
judgment.") (internal footnote omitted).
235 See id
236 See Foster, supra note 106, at 727.
237 See id at 667.
238 See id
239 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1609-1612
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against third parties.24 Argentina needs third party cooperation to
make payments on the exchange debt, which the Injunction
precludes in absence of payments to the holdouts.24 ' Argentina
has shown, however, that it is willing to default on the exchange
bonds if that means the Republic does not have to pay Elliot and
friends.24 2 The coercive element of the Injunction fails to compel
the behavior sought.
In future cases the trial court should aim its equitable relief
more squarely at the debtor. As Secretary Mellon noted,
sovereigns cannot be forced to honor debt obligations; they must
do so voluntarily.2 43 If only domestic pressures or the need to tap
credit markets can induce a sovereign debtor to make debt
payments, the remedy must apply pressure to one of those
levers. 2 44 Public opinion is generally in favor of the sovereign's
efforts to thwart the collection attempts of the vulture funds.245
Such is the case in Argentina's dispute with Elliot, where
Argentine President Cristina Femndez de Kirchner employed the
conflict to rally domestic fervor.2 46 The pressure in many cases,
therefore, must be placed on the debtor's ability to tap into credit
markets, rather than the ability to satisfy debts already incurred.24 7
The trial court, in the most egregious cases, must be able to
impair the debtor's ability to access credit markets.2 48 Rather than
using the Injunction to impair Argentina's ability to continue to
pay the exchange debt, 249 the court should have granted an
240 See Order Clarifying the Scope of the Injunction, supra note 11, at 10-12.
241 See Injunction, supra note 44, 2-5.
242 See Salmon, supra note 169.
243 Mellon, supra note 229, at 212.
244 See id.
245 See, e.g., Heather Stewart & Uki Goili, Argentina Fears Default After American
Court Ruling, THE GUARDIAN ((Nov. 22, 2012, 2:43 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/
world/2012/nov/22/american-ruling-fears-default-argentina.
246 See Stewart & Gofii, supra note 245 (quoting President Ferndndez: "We will not
surrender money at the cost of hunger and exclusion of millions of Argentines .... We
are not going to give in."). Economy Minister Hernin Lorenzino further stated, "These
funds are vultures who seek to profit by betting on technical default .... We will
continue defending Argentina's interests at every instances necessary and that includes
going before the [U.S.] supreme court." Id.
247 See Mellon, supra note 229, at 212.
248 Id.
249 See Injunction, supra note 44, 2-5.
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injunction against Argentina that would have prevented the
Republic from issuing additional New York law debt securities.
In cases, such as NML Capital, where the debtor has proved apt at
disregarding its obligations under mutually agreed upon contracts
with creditors and willing to disregard the judgments of courts to
which the debtor voluntarily submitted to jurisdiction, a
meaningful remedy is essential to ending the dispute. The court
should refrain from granting such an injunction, unless the holdout
creditors can carry the burden of showing that the equities weigh
substantially in their favor, no less intrusive remedy will end the
dispute, and that the sovereign debtor has gone to extraordinary
lengths to prevent the creditors from exercising their rights under
the debt securities.
An order would accompany each injunction. The order would
require the debtor to submit to the court a restructuring plan,
including a schedule and formula for making payments to the
holdout creditors. If the creditor rejects the plan, the court shall
require the debtor to submit subsequent plans so long as the court
determines the holdout creditors are negotiating in good faith. A
condition would be placed on each injunction providing that it will
be lifted only once the holdout creditors and debtor agree to a
restructuring plan or the court determines that the holdouts are not
negotiating in good faith.
There is some evidence that this is the approach the Second
Circuit intended, once it became clear that Argentina would rather
default than voluntarily pay the holdouts.25 0 After a recent
hearing, the court issued an order allowing Argentina to "submit in
writing to the court the precise terms of any alternative payment
formula and schedule to which it is prepared to commit."2 5 '
250 Order, NAL Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 12-105 (L))
[hereinafter Payment Terms Order], available at http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-
salmon/flles/2013/02/BlawXIQ6MK6DIHO2.pdf ("[I]t is hereby ordered that, on or
before March 29, 2013, Argentina submit in writing to the court the precise terms of any
alternative payment formula and schedule to which it is prepared to commit.").
251 Id. ("Argentina [is to] indicate: (1) how and when it proposes to make current
those debt obligations on the original bonds that have gone unpaid over the last 11 years;
(2) the rate at which it proposes to repay debt obligations on the original bonds going
forward; and (3) what assurances, if any, it can provide that the official government
action necessary to implement its propose will be taken, and the timetable for such
action.").
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Argentina was not receptive to the court's olive branch.2 52
Argentina did submit a plan to the court, but it offered
substantially the same deal available under the 2005 and 2010
exchanges. 253  As one could have predicted, NML declined the
proposal.254  After victories before the district court and the
Second Circuit, twice, Argentina could hardly have expected Elliot
to accept a deal on the same terms available to it at the outset of
the controversy.25 5
Regardless of its success in this case, the order shows that the
court, recognizing the realities of the situation, desires to find a
mutually agreeable resolution that will end this decade long
quarrel. 256 The court realizes the district court's Injunction will be
undercut by another Argentine default.25 7 Instead of that
unsustainable result, which harms the Second Circuit's credibility
and leaves the holdout creditors back at square one, the court
hoped to encourage Argentina to submit a plan that could be
mutually agreed upon, given that the Republic would have input in
its construction.2 58
While the idea floated by the Second Circuit faltered in the
Argentine case, if each party were provided with the right mixture
of sticks and carrots, similarly situated parties in future cases may
be willing to engage in court monitored restructuring. For
instance, if the sovereign debtor were enjoined from registering
debt securities, once again gaining access to credit markets may
252 See Response of Appellees to the Republic of Argentina's March 29 Proposal,
NML Capital, Lid, 699 F.3d 246 (2d Cir. 2012) (Nos. 12-105, 12-109, 12-111, 12-157,
12-158, 12-163, 12-164, 12-170, 12-176, 12-185, 12-189, 12-214, 12-909, 12-914, 12-
916, 12-919, 12-920, 12-923, 12-924, 12-926, 12-939, 12-943, 12-951, 12-968, 12-971,




256 See Payment Terms Order, supra note 250.
257 See Mark Weidemaier, Pari passu Realpolitik, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 1, 2013,
11:25 AM) [hereinafter Realpolitik], http://www.creditslips.org/creditslips/2013/03/pari-
passu-realpolitik.html ; see also Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Bankruptcy, Day One: Market
Rallies, CREDIT SLIPS (Mar. 1, 2013, 4:27 PM), http://www.creditslips.org/
creditslips/2013/03/sovereign-bankruptcy-day-one-market-rallies.html.
258 See Realpolitik, supra note 257 ("Given the court's limited enforcement power
in the sovereign context, [this] kind of clash calls for a negotiated solution."); see also
Gelpern, supra note 257.
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provide the necessary incentive to spark negotiation, even in the
most acrimonious of conflicts. By contrast, in cases that satisfy
the strict requirements set forth above, the holdout creditors should
be eager to end the perpetual stalemate and gain any repayment in
excess of pennies on the dollar offered in the initial restructuring.
Also, when dealing with most creditors the court will have
traditional case management tools at its disposal to encourage
agreement on a restructuring plan, which are not available when
dealing with the sovereign debtor.2 59
Moreover, the proposed injunction would not carry the
negative implications associated with holding the vast array of
third parties subject to contempt sanctions for the debtor's
violation of the Injunction.2 60 Instead of prohibiting third party
financial service firms from aiding and abetting a violation of the
injunction, the injunction would prevent the SEC from accepting
or approving any prospectus, offering circular, or other document
filed in connection with a debt offering. By applying the
injunction to the SEC the court would avoid the enforcement
problems that portend imposing an equitable remedy against a
sovereign and would also quell concerns about the legitimacy of
potentially subjecting third party payment systems participants to
contempt sanctions.261
Resistance to this plan is likely to stem from the concern that
such a remedy will facilitate settlements above what is offered in
initial restructuring efforts and, therefore, incentivize holdout
litigation. Such concerns are not inconsequential. These
arguments cut to the essence of the criticism of vulture funds.2 62
For some, the idea of well funded investors purchasing securities
at rock bottom prices, refusing to participate in restructuring, and
then suing for a windfall judgment is the height of inequity.263
Any system that allows the vulture funds, which have
comparatively less skin in the game, to swoop in and demand full
259 See generally Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982)
(describing trend encouraging judges to facilitate settlement and the tools used to achieve
that goal).
260 See Order Clarifying the Scope of the Injunction, supra note 11.
261 See Weidemaier & Gelpem, supra note 213, at 6-7.
262 See ,e.g., Fisch & Gentile, supra note 225, 1087-90 (outlining some of the most
common arguments against distressed asset investors).
263 See id. at 1045, 1089.
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payment when investors less able to pursue the debtor in court are
forced to settle for a large haircut in restructuring is inherently
unfair.264  The concern is that the availability of the remedy
suggested above will encourage holdout litigation, further
frustrating the traditional restructuring process. 2 65  For instance,
the Argentine restructuring garnered ninety-one percent
participation.26 6 The argument against a judicial remedy that
rewards and encourages the dissenting nine percent is not without
its merits.
The nature of distressed asset investing, however, should not
be an impediment to resolving disputes of in the most thorny
sovereign debt cases. The merits of vulture funds within the larger
restructuring system present policy questions beyond the scope of
this Note. It is sufficient to clarify here that the price and
circumstances under which the bonds are purchased do not affect
the rights asserted by the bondholder in subsequent litigation.267
The bondholder does not hold a lesser right under the contract
because the rights were purchased during a time when the debtor
was suffering financial stress.2 68 The bondholder, whether a
pension fund or a vulture fund, has the right to petition the court
for enforcement of rights under the contract. 26 9 Furthermore, the
fact that the vulture fund was able to purchase at a deep discount
264 See id
265 See id. at 1089 ("[Clritics argue that the potential for vulture funds to disrupt
restructurings and to receive special payments not only discourages sovereign debtors
from entering into the restructuring process but it also creates a collective action problem
that dissuades other creditors from participating in the process.").
266 NML Capital, Ltd., 699 F.3d at 253.
267 See generally Jonathan Goren, Note, State-to-State Debts: Sovereign Immunity
and the "Vulture" Hunt, 41 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 681, 700 (2010) ("While vulture
fund litigation is not exceedingly common . . . when an investor has a legitimate claim,
and the means and expertise to bring suit in the appropriate forum, they almost always
win.").
268 See generally Saloni Kantaria, Looks Can be Deceiving: Holdout Litigation
Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 10 ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST Soc'Y PRAC.
GROUPS 26, 27-28 (2009) (overcoming the jurisdictional restrictions in the FSIA is one of
the major hurdles in sovereign debt litigation, not establishing that the distressed asset
investor has the right under the contract to bring suit).
269 See, e.g., James M. Hays II, The Sovereign Debt Dilemma, 75 BROOK. L. REV.
905, 908 (explaining that without indenture trustee or other official with the power to
"strip bondholders of their right to pursue individual legal remedies," all bondholders are
free to do so).
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does not speak to the nature of the rights being purchased, but
rather the value the market places on the securities. 2 70  The
discount in price is, in part, due to the increased risk of
nonpayment that accompanies the debtor's financial distress.27 1 In
purchasing the bonds, the investor is taking a calculated risk that it
will be able to gain full repayment of the contract while incurring
reasonable costs. 27 2  The fact that distressed asset investors are
willing to incur the greater risk of nonpayment inherent in buying
the securities once the debtor is experiencing fiscal problems does
not make their rights under the bond contract inferior to those that
purchased in the initial offering and held until default.
The court will only exercise its discretion to implement the
proposed injunction in the most drastic of cases, where there
appears to be no end to the stalemate. Under such circumstances,
the push towards settlement seems appropriate. The high burden
to be satisfied by the creditor before gaining the remedy should
neutralize much of the adverse impact on traditional restructuring
that may be associated with this proposal. The high burden will
also ensure that creditors everywhere are not flocking to the
Southern District of New York with defaulted bonds in tow. As
seen in the Argentine case, if restructuring is to be facilitated in
the most difficult cases, the debtor must be encouraged to shift
from its absolute position of nonpayment. The court's equitable
powers can be utilized to bring otherwise unwilling debtors and
creditors to table.
270 See, e.g., Jonathan C. Lippert, Vulture Funds: The Reason Why Congolese Debt
May Force a Revision of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 21 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1,
34 (2008) ("The riskiest element of the vulture funds' investment was not the defaulted
Congolese debt that they purchased; it was the risk of successfully navigating the FSIA
in U.S. courts.").
271 See Horacio T. Liendo III, Sovereign Debt Litigation Problems in the United
States: A Proposed Solution, 9 OR. REV. INT'L L. 107, 110 (2007) (arguing that bond
terms correlate to risk, in that where bond terms are more attractive, the risk of
nonpayment is generally higher); see also Samuel E. Goldman, Comment, Mavericks in
the Market: The Emerging Problem of Hold-outs in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 5
UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 159, 182 (noting that bond contract terms, specifically
interest rates, reflect the risk of permanent nonpayment).
272 See generally James Thuo Gathii, The Sanctity of Sovereign Loan Contracts and
Its Origin in Enforcement Litigation, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REv. 251, 304 (2006) ("[Ilt
would therefore be reasonable to assume that these holdouts are often aware of the
financial handicaps of sovereign debtors and by buying bonds underwritten by such
indebted sovereigns they are assuming the risk of non-payment.").
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In addition to the benefits in terms of added efficiency that
come from ending the perpetual litigation cycle, the agreement
between the debtor and creditors will be blessed with the court's
stamp of approval, providing comfort to both sides that the terms
of the plan will be respected.2 73 Interest holders outside the
primary parties would also reap the benefits of settlement. For
instance, in the Argentine case, the holders of the exchange bonds
would continue to receive payments without the constant specter
of default, Argentina and its citizens would avoid the
repercussions of another default, and Argentina's trading partners
would receive assurance that the Republic has eliminated a threat
to its financial stability.
V. Conclusion
The decisions in NAL Capital were a victory for Elliot and
other distressed asset investors who have pursued a judicial
enforcement mechanism capable of compelling payment on
defaulted sovereign debt securities. The court's willingness to
employ its equitable powers against Argentina, despite the
Republic's sovereign immunity, is a powerful precedent for
creditors who opt out of restructuring, even if the Injunction in the
Argentine case will ultimately fail to produce the desired result.2 74
In order to facilitate restructuring in the most precarious
sovereign debt cases, the court must craft a remedy applying
pressure directly on the sovereign debtor. While Judge Griesa's
Injunction was a creative attempt to bridge the enforcement gap in
sovereign debt litigation, it will fail to meet its objectives because
it focuses its most coercive provisions on third parties. Now that
the court has shown its willingness to experiment with equitable
powers in sovereign debt litigation, it should utilize that tool to
induce negotiation. The approach suggested here is but one
possible avenue towards resolution. There are likely to be
additional failed attempts along the way. If, however, the court
were able to craft a mechanism capable of bringing the most
recalcitrant debtors and relentless vultures to settlement, the future
of sovereign restructuring would be the major beneficiary. Added
efficiency not only benefits the sovereign debtor and the holdout
273 See Payment Terms Order, supra note 250.
274 See Order Clarifying the Scope of the Injunction, supra note I1.
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creditors, but also benefits the countless other constituencies
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